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Summary: 
Representations of, and attitudes towards, foreigners take place within the complex 
system of values and meaning that constitutes what we call a national identity. In the French case, 
different conceptions of citizenship give rise to different attitudes towards immigrants. These 
conceptions, even if they could be related to antagonistic theories of democracy, blend together 
within the citizens’ representations, giving the opportunity to combine advantages from each 
model, namely, cohesion and inclusion. But the mix of citizenship representations occurs 
successfully only when the political dimension of citizenship is accepted. Where this is not the 
case, the antagonistic potential of both understanding of citizenship and immigrants develops and 
endangers the coherence of the civic and political national culture.  
 
Introduction1: 
It is well known that the way immigrants are received in a country depends on its people’s 
perceptions and conceptions of foreigners. Even if the law governing access to, and settlement 
in, a specific country is not the mere reflection of public opinion, or even of the voters’ will, 
obviously, this law does incorporate a certain amount of its civic culture. Above all, the 
integration of migrants in a country does not depend only on the legal framework. It is very 
much related to everyday interactions between nationals and newcomers, to the way the former 
accept the latter. Much research has been carried out on the analysis of public attitudes towards 
foreigners to try and explain the main causes of xenophobia. They demonstrate that attitudes 
towards strangers are very dependent on social factors but also, that they are very closely related 
to more general attitudes.2 In this paper, based on qualitative data, I would like to show how 
attitudes are shaped within the complex system of values and meaning that constitutes what we 
are accustomed to calling a national identity. Indeed, they constitute one single element in the 
more general question of the evolution and adaptation of national identities and civic cultures in 
the changing dimension of democracies.3 Improving the cultural and political conditions of 
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foreigners’ reception in a specific country means taking into consideration this whole pattern of 
meanings and values. 
 
Modern citizenship refers to the nation-state. It has been the framework within which 
mass democracy has emerged, and has provided status for the new members of political 
communities in the making, a combination of legally defined rights and duties, but also of norms 
of behaviour, corresponding to the fact, or the will, that all members of a nation-state should be 
able to consent, in some degree, to the decisions affecting their lives. But the first steps of mass 
democracy occurred in a context of restricted mobility of men and goods. The integration of the 
masses into politics resulted from the invention of nations and the writing of histories linking the 
citizens to their states: people’s self-esteem has been strengthened by their nation’s history, their 
glorious heritage, in exchange for their peaceful participation in the legitimising process of civic 
duties4. Today, the growing mobility of people is one of the main long-term threats affecting this 
construction, together with the general increase in education levels that give rise to a concomitant 
rise in people’s expectations concerning their impact on governmental inputs. Other factors 
include the tendency towards political integration, as in the case of the European Union which 
challenges the borders of the older nations and, of course, the internationalisation of economies.5 
The challenge facing democracies is then to find a way of ensuring both cohesion and inclusion6: 
cohesion, that is, ensuring that citizens will feel and act as members of a common state, as they 
used to do, or as they were supposed to do; and inclusion, that is the capacity of turning 
newcomers into members, especially newcomers arriving with an enduring attachment to their 
former political community. Some authors question the reality of national citizenship today, as 
they note that the rights and duties traditionally attached to citizenship7 no longer depend on 
belonging to the national community, at least for most of these rights and duties.8 But most 
specialists consider that a national citizenship is a necessity as the states remain the key actors of 
international politics and still constitute the framework for the implementation of democracy.9 
The question of the proper access to specific rights for temporary or permanent residents in 
reference to the rights granted to full citizens has been discussed by a number of important 
migration specialists engaged in the democratic debate.10 
Beyond the question of the integration of migrants, political theorists or philosophers 
have passionate arguments over the right principles and the institutional arrangements which 
would ensure both the integration of newcomers into the citizenry and the involvement of all – 
old and newcomers – in the practise of citizen’s duties. Most of these arguments stumble on the 
question of the human nature. The appropriate institutional arrangement closely depends on the 
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postulated profound motivations of man’s behaviour, on the supposed sources of human 
greatness. Is human spirit heavily dependent on the place and conditions where a person was 
born and grew up? Or is humanity moved by a universal disposition to rationality? This 
philosophical question lies behind the exciting debate between communitarians (Taylor, 
MacIntyre, Walzer or Sandel in particular) and liberals (Rawls’s work being the departure point of 
the debate). Should we build institutions which respect the communities considered as the proper 
framework for human beings to feel and behave in a responsible way? Or should we develop 
institutions, which deal only with (free) individuals and whose main purpose is to respect equally 
the preferences of individual citizens’?11 The very concept of nation incorporates this dilemma 
between distinctive identity and universalism: as Louis Dumont puts it very clearly, ‘a nation is 
the holist conception of individuals’.12 Furthermore Benedict Anderson based his study of the 
national imagination13 on the observation that the distinctive conception of one’s nation has 
become a universal need.14 
Concerning integration, this dichotomy between a holistic, particularistic and cohesive 
conception of the link between citizens and a individualist, universalistic and integrative one15 has 
given rise to a categorisation of nationalism or national consciousness: civic versus ethnic. France 
and Germany have served as the main examples of this opposition, developed through different 
point of views and data by such different and famous authors as Louis Dumont and Rogers 
Brubaker.16 France was supposed to have a universalistic conception of citizenship, which dates 
back to the Revolution and results in a traditional domination of citizenship laws by jus soli. 
Renan put it well in saying that nation, in the French sense, was a daily plebiscite17. In 
comparison, German national feeling was described as ethnic18, dating back to a romantic and 
organic conception of the Vaterland and still inspiring restrictive naturalisation rates because of 
citizenship laws based on jus sanguinis. Beyond the cases of France and Germany, the civic and 
ethnic understanding of nationhood were often valued rather unequally, the ethnic one being 
considered as less satisfactory than the civic one because of its postulated easier tolerance of, or 
attractiveness to, xenophobia19. The categorisation was based essentially on the study of public 
discourses and of citizenship laws. That is why the general convergence of citizenship laws in 
Europe20 and the widespread success of nationalist movements there have undermined the 
efficacy of the dichotomy civic/ethnic understanding of nationhood.21  
So even if nationalists still try to impose a unique conception of national identity, a 
homogeneous way of imagining a specific nation and belonging to it, many scholars agree that 
national consciousness is a complex or composite matter. Observing it from an historical point 
of view, Bryan Jenkins and Spyros A. Sofos write:  
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This raises again the issue of the fundamental ambiguity of nationalism: how membership 
of the nation is to be defined. As European nation-states established themselves in the 
period 1870-1918, the open ‘citizenship’ model (geared to social integration and 
stabilisation) was merged with an opposite set of principles, culturally or ethnically 
exclusive (and geared to the marginalisation of the ‘unassimilable’ and ‘enemies of the 
state’). The tension between the two has remained, and according to political 
circumstances the emphasis has shifted from one to the other.22 
 
The careful study of a specific understanding of nationhood has to account for its 
complexity and its main tensions. The French case has given rise to this kind of study. Yves 
Déloye, for instance, has described the tremendous conflict between Catholics and Republicans 
about the meaning of citizenship and national belonging during the Third Republic (1870-
1945)23. On a more theoretical level, Dominique Schnapper, in order to work out a heuristic 
conception of the nation, has reviewed the many different conceptions of the French nation and 
stressed the main arguments on the matter.24 But these arguments, and especially the question of 
the nature, natural or arbitrary, of the link between fellow citizens, are not restricted to an elite, to 
intellectuals or politicians; they affect the representations of the citizens and structure them very 
deeply. 
 
Theoreticians make assumptions on what people are and why they behave as they do. 
But, if they are given the time to think, citizens can give some insights into the way they relate to 
others and specifically to their fellow citizens. This may not completely account for their 
behaviour, as all sociological processes are not visible,25 but it can still provide some evidence 
about the functioning of the political community. When people talk about themselves as citizens 
they do not speak about themselves as they usually are, but rather about what they think they 
should be. Nevertheless the way they conceive their role and relate to one another outlines the 
main features of the national community. If analysed and reconstituted very carefully, the self-
representation of a specific citizenry gives an insight into the complex pattern of meanings and 
values that constitutes a national consciousness and/or a civic culture.  
 
The French case: two models of citizenship.26  
Although described through several models, the representations of citizenship in France 
can be summed up by a single definition: to be a citizen means taking responsibility for one's ties 
with fellow citizens. But the qualities and roles implied by this definition are directly dependent 
on how ties among fellow citizens are conceived: according to whether they are considered as 
natural, concrete, historically-validated ties, or if they appear as arbitrary, artificial ties defined by 
 4
administrative borders. Consequently, two models of citizenship emerge; the first I will call 
citizenship by inheritance, and the second, citizenship with reservations. 
In this definition, politics apparently plays a minor role. Here the description of 
citizenship is more closely related to what political science refers to as civility. It is the relationship 
to others that defines what French citizens mean by citizenship, not the relationship to power. 
Approached with an open methodology27 (which excludes pressure or incentives to interviewees 
to classify and prioritise their values and feelings), the understanding of citizenship does provide 
an insight into the non-political dimension of national consciousness, that is, the sociological 
dimension of belonging.28 There lies the very difference between nationalism and national 
consciousness; the first is political by nature, as it is linked to the state and the borders of its 
power and protection; the second is not, as it is first of all dedicated to the specific group of 
belonging (one amongst many) that constitutes a nation, and explores the many ways of feeling a 
part of it, or not.29 
In more empirical terms, each of the people I met in the course of the study clearly 
expressed the feeling of having no direct, personal access to power in his/her own right, and 
therefore no means of consenting, or not, to the decisions that bind him/her. On the other hand, 
each of the people interviewed also knew that his/her strength with regard to power lay in 
numbers. If a citizen has power as such (i.e. as a citizen and not because of his/her personal 
attributes), it is because citizens together are (all) powerful. The power of each citizen depends on 
the others, on his/her fellow citizens. So it is the relationship he/she has with his/her fellow 
citizens that defines the limits of his/her power. Thus we can see how ordinary citizenship is 
described through ties with others, and through the way these ties are fostered and maintained. 
But the various conceptions about how these ties bind citizens result in differing models of 
citizenship. 
This first one, termed ‘citizenship by inheritance’, hinges on a ‘naturalist’, so to speak, 
conception of ties among fellow citizens. Here a citizen is first and foremost a Frenchman. The 
model is organized around three words - time, land (the French soil), and family. Land is also the 
very substance of the inheritance, the heritage, the French land that fellow citizens possess 
together. It is at the same time the theatre of time passing, land and time being closely linked. 
This model of citizenship is described by the family metaphor. The family is the link in time and 
space; it is both the model from which forms of national solidarity are derived and the cause of 
this solidarity. It is because one belongs to a family, because the members of this family and 
those of past generations have suffered to make this country what it is, that their heirs, today's 
citizens, are what they are, and have the means of exercising their citizenship with dignity. The 
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national bond, which is the basis of the civic bond, is in fact merely the extension of the family 
tie from which ideally it takes its form.  
In this model, when one says he/she is a French citizen, he/she says who he/she is: 
he/she is the particular product of a history that has taken place in a particular place, on a 
specific soil, delimited by set borders. This particularity does not affect him/her, he/she is proud 
of it, even flaunts it. It gives him/her a substance, a strength that protects him/her. The national 
element, in this model, draws its force from identification with one's nation. The history of which 
he/she is a product has an intrinsic weight and significance that partly relieves him/her from 
having to justify his/her own existence by his/her own achievements. From a certain standpoint, 
the centuries have done it for him/her.30 This is the gist of one interviewee's comment: ‘The 
storm may blow, but I'll be fine, my roots are deeply planted in the ground’. In exchange for a 
relative powerlessness over the course of things - since, after all, it is on the historical level that 
things take on meaning: at this level a citizen can do nothing, he/she is insignificant – he/she 
benefits from the strength and power of his/her nation, that of a whole of which he/she is part. 
(see Table 1) 
Insert Table 1 here 
The second model is very different. It is structured by the opposition between two 
dimensions of life: what is considered as the legitimate level of existence for citizens, that of 
individuals and interindividual relationships; and the other one, the collective level. In this model, 
the citizen only knows (acknowledges) other individuals, meets them and exchanges with them in 
a totally independent unrestricted manner. The whole problem will be to move from this sphere 
to the sphere of relationships organized on a societal level, and to find roles that preserve an 
individual's autonomy and capacity to have exchanges with any other individual. In the realm of 
‘reservations’, the preponderance of relationships between individuals filters through the 
domination of the ‘I/you’ pronoun pair, which contrasts with the ‘I/we’ pair predominant in the 
first model. The individual exists in the relations he/she establishes with other people, each one 
taken as an individual. Any encounter with another person is a process of mutual 
acknowledgment that allows each not only to recognize the other, but also, by reciprocity, to 
recognize himself. The encounter introduces an identification process that takes place on the 
singular, unique mode, which presupposes an ability to communicate, to exchange with anyone at 
all, each confirming the other in his/her reality as a human being, in his claim to universality. The 
individual is not linked eternally to anything by nature: he/she is apt to change, to be transformed 
depending on the encounters of the moment. He/she is bound only by his affections. He/she 
rejects any idea of groups or belonging. ‘I hate to belong’, say the people closest to this model.31 
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In this second system of meanings, the frontiers that determine a group - be they official 
borders setting the administrative limits of a territory or country, or symbolic frontiers of group 
membership - mark the limits between those who are alike, the members of a group, and those 
who are different, foreigners. In this sense, all frontiers in this model appear as a negation of the 
individual, the unique. The people closest to this world vision speak of ‘distortion’ with regard to 
the traces left by one's education, which make each individual identifiable as a member of his/her 
nation, religion, social class or ‘race’. Anyone who defines himself/herself otherwise, by the 
groups he/she belongs to, has lost respect for the human being, respect for the universal which is 
the only value, the only core of humanity by which an individual knows he/she is a human being. 
In this world vision, there is no people, no territory - since there are no legitimate borders 
to mark out or delimit space - or history: human existence is timeless. An individual's memory is 
limited to what he/she has experienced, the rest is mere ‘distortion’, enrolment. Yet the people 
encountered in the course of this study and who predominantly fit this model know that the 
world they live in functions differently. As long as they acknowledge that progress exists, they can 
indeed imagine that it must, in one way or another, produce an accumulation that is not all 
negative. Still, there is no place on earth for those who want to live alone. Although everyone 
benefits from progress, no one can escape from it either. One is indebted only for what one has 
chosen or at least accepted. Hence the individual, morally, owes nothing to society. However, 
he/she cannot not acknowledge the efforts of those who work, those whose toil produces what 
he/she benefits from. He/she cannot not acknowledge that they, too, are people like him/her, 
that they may also feel the weight of society on their shoulders and rebel at the idea of being its 
prisoner. That is why he/she cannot, without reservations32 enjoy the fruit of their efforts and 
give nothing in return. 
In the first model, citizenship represents the efforts a national must make to preserve and 
develop the country he/she has inherited. In the second, citizenship represents the effort an 
individual must make to accept the collective dimension of human existence from which he feels 
remote from the outset but in which he/she will attempt to find a place. To the figure of the 
traitor - traitor to one's family, one's ancestors, one's country, to what makes it great - that 
characterizes the lack of civic sense in the first model, the second model substitutes that of the 
profiteer, one who takes without giving anything in return. But - and it is very important in this 
model – because each person is the only one capable of assessing the value he/she gives to what 
he benefits from and the cost of the effort to take part in society, he/she alone determines, at 
every moment, the level and forms of his/her participation. No one can or should judge what 
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another should give. This model is utterly incapable of representing what is imposed as anything 
but some sort of constraint. 
 
Representations of immigrants in the two models 
Obviously, these two models of citizenship involve different representations of strangers 
and immigrants. In the first model, the familial metaphor is all pervasive. Per se, strangers should 
not be a problem as they form the negative image that enables a people to forge its own identity. 
Moreover, as a family, a people need to include new members regularly in order to continue. 
Following the rationale behind this model, the problem with immigrants lies in their number: a 
few immigrants are a source of wealth, a large number a source of poverty because (as the 
interviewees close to this first model stated) they no longer try to integrate themselves, to find a 
place in the family. Actually, the people interviewed who were close to this model were very 
concerned about foreigners or, more precisely, immigrants, even if many of them had rather bad 
feelings about this rejection. Their ignorance of the interviewer’s opinion on the matter largely 
explains their hesitation to express negative feelings toward immigrants, at least at the beginning 
of the interview. Later, as confidence increased and the interviewee became reassured that they 
would not be judged by the interviewer on their opinion, they gradually came to express some of 
their resentment against those foreigners who have settled in France but do not seem to like the 
country or the French people. This is the main grievance. Those who immigrate should be willing 
to find a place in the French community, and should therefore demonstrate their desire to get 
closer to French people. And this should be a matter of mutual feelings. Anyway, even for those 
expressing some kind of xenophobia, the greatest danger for a nation in that model does not 
stem from foreigners but from the citizens themselves; it is their growing individualism, and the 
fact that they tend more and more to forget what they owe to their ancestors, which is going to 
destroy the nation. More than European integration, even more than immigration, the 
interviewees closest to this meaning of life fear the lack of cohesion of the nation, the lack of 
involvement of their fellow citizens in the community.  
In the second model, ‘citizenship with reservations’, the relationship to immigrants is 
obviously very different as foreigners do not exist: there are only human beings. In this model, 
where one is born is due to chance, the hearth does not belong to anyone. The greatness of 
human beings is that they are able to understand and exchange feelings and ideas with everyone. 
To consider others as strangers means giving up humanity, and giving way to any kind of 
indoctrination inherent in collective belonging. To return to the two requirements of present 
democracy, if the first model lacks inclusiveness, the second lacks cohesiveness. So, this high 
 8
degree of tolerance to foreigners – or rather, this strong interest in different people – goes with 
an obvious weakness, i.e. lack of involvement in public matters. 
This research was qualitative: the interviewees were chosen for their diversity of social 
backgrounds but obviously do not constitute a representative sample that could allow for a 
systematic sociological explanation of their representations. Nevertheless, some convergence of 
the social characteristics of the interviewees closest to each model enables us to take into 
consideration their main socio-demographic characteristics. The interviewees whose self-
representation as citizens is closer to the first model tend to be either retired or at the beginning 
of their work life or, in the case of women, at the age where their children are grown up and have 
left home. Few of them have experienced social advancement or geographical or cultural 
mobility. If we analyze in more details the way social background influences the self 
representation of a citizen, it seems that the socio-demographic characteristics of those 
interviewees closer to this model reveal a common feature: a dominant need or desire for 
integration, for being recognized as a member of a group, which results in a tendency towards 
identification with the nation in particular. On the other hand, the interviewees whose world 
vision is closer to the second model demonstrate a prevailing tendency towards individualization, 
that is, towards the rejection of any kind of belonging. This is in accordance with their social 
characteristics, as they were fully integrated and had already achieved important progress in the 
field of integration in terms of career and social advancement. 
The two models of citizenship are related to the two conceptions of the human being, 
which underlie theoretical arguments between communitarians and liberals. One important 
difference is that, even if they are logically incompatible, these two models do coexist in most of 
the systems of representations of ordinary French citizens. With the exception of philosophers, 
who have to be logically consistent, ordinary people do have and express inconsistent 
representations of themselves and of society. They do feel at the same time part of the whole and 
a whole in themselves. Their own description of their citizenship fits in part the communitarian 
conception and, also, partly the liberal one; it derives from both the ethnic and the civic 
understanding of nationhood. The weight of each model in his/her self-representation differs 
from one person to another. Some people have either a very particularistic, or a very 
universalistic conception of themselves; but most of them are in-between and combine elements 
from the two models.  
 
Comparative data. 
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This study, the results of which have been presented above, was not a comparative one.33 
But the academic literature on British representations of nation and citizenship is rich. It is easy 
to find evidence of a similar complexity, of a combination of both holistic and individualistic 
conceptions of the citizens’ link. Bikhu Parehk, in his article ‘Defining British Identity’, stresses 
this duality of traditions in the public discourses on the subject.34 Mikael Hjerm used the data of 
the International Social Survey Programme of 1995 in order to compare four countries, including 
Great Britain, with regard to the relationship between national identities, national pride and 
xenophobia35. Referring to the categorisation between civic and ethnic versions of national 
identity, he classifies the different factors of importance in making British people (or Australian, 
German or Swedish), namely: to be born in the country, to have lived for most of one’s life there, 
having the citizenship, speaking the language, respecting the country’s political institutions and 
laws and feeling British (or Australian, or German, or Swedish)36. The general results of the study 
show the rarity of an exclusive ethnic conception (from 1.2 in Sweden to 6.8 in Britain) and the 
high frequency of mixed representations, especially in Britain: 67.3 per cent of British 
respondents have combined civic and ethnic bases of nationhood. Using a very different 
methodology – actually, a more comparable way of investigating national feelings with the French 
study – Pamela Johnston Conover, Ivor M. Crewe and Donald D. Searing have also shown the 
very mixed nature of British representations of citizenship. In 1991 they published the main 
results of comparative research (USA / Britain) conducted through focus groups37 and meant to 
test the veracity of some assertions concerning citizens as expressed in the communitarian / 
liberal debate. They found that ‘in the minds of citizens citizenship is a complex matter, and that 
the roles constructed by citizens themselves blend together liberal and communitarian elements 
in ways unanticipated by many political theorists.’38 They interpret the surprising combination of 
communitarian and liberal arguments found in the study as the evidence of the possibility of 
having ‘some of the benefits of communautarianism in a basically liberal polity’39  
When they speak about their rights, their duties, about what foreigners mean to them, or 
more generally, about who they think they are as citizens, people reveal the very substance of 
their ‘civic culture’ and de facto, of their national identity. A national identity is not a specific 
understanding of nationhood, a quite homogeneous imagined community elaborated in public 
discourses in order to give sense to what has happened and is happening in a specific country. 
This kind of discourse, that can come close to nationalism if used to legitimize a restrictive 
understanding of nationhood, may influence the national identity of one’s country, but not in the 
short term. This is because a national identity resembles a culture or an ideology, in the 
anthropological sense40, and therefore changes slowly. In the fullest sense of the term, a national 
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identity is a complex pattern of meanings and values related to the group whose borders are 
defined by the state’s capacity to intervene, and which underlies the varied representations and 
attitudes of the citizens towards each other and towards non-citizens, foreigners, immigrants. A 
national identity is the very complicated combination of the traces of all the stories of the nation 
heard and experienced by a people. It means that it connects varied - not to say antagonistic - 
understandings of nationhood, and that it is structured not only by positive feelings towards the 
nation – the bases of belonging to it - but also the many ways of rejecting it, escaping it or 
resisting the national definition of the self. In this sense, a national identity is the sociological 
meeting place of the individual and this specific collective that is the nation, a collective that 
during last decades may have been the main vehicle for learning abstract solidarity. It can be 
reached only by identifying its constitutive parts, through the in-depth and careful understanding 
of individuals’ representations and reconstituting some of it thanks to their repetitions and 
associations. Attitudes towards foreigners are just a piece in the jigsaw puzzle of national identity 
and civic culture, and they cannot be properly understood and analysed independently. The 
configuration is necessarily a complex and uneven one, as the varied subgroups in a country will 
display patterns of representation sometimes far removed from the national link. The main 
purpose of the analysis is precisely to give an account of the many connections that structure a 
specific national identity.  
We have seen that in the case of France, and probably in the British and American cases 
as reported by Pamela Conover and her colleagues, the representations of the civic and national 
link combine meanings and values that refer to antagonistic philosophical or theoretical 
conceptions of the national community. And yet, to a certain extent, this capacity or tolerance to 
contradiction is beneficial to democracy, because it may allow combining, in the same civic 
culture, benefits that derive from competitive understandings of the national community. As 
stated above, contemporary democracy needs cohesion as well as inclusion. On the theoretical 
level, what gives rise to one tends to prevent the other. The communitarian conception of the 
national link fosters cohesion whereas the liberal one promotes inclusion. This characteristic of 
social agents to need both identification and individualisation, and the resulting capacity of 
citizens to display contradictory representations of themselves, to conceive themselves at the 
same time in holist and individualist modes, may be one of the solutions to this contemporary 
democratic dilemma. It may allow, in the French case, for the combination of the cohesive power 
of citizenship by inheritance and the inclusive power of citizenship with reservation. So, to a 
certain extent, the lack of demand of logical consistency offers a functional if not a 
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philosophically satisfying41, solution to the dilemma of present democracy, ensuring both 
cohesion and inclusion.  
However the last point that I would like to make in this paper is that the complex nature 
of a national identity does not guarantee the positive effect of this coexistence of logically 
incompatible models. Again, a national identity does include, with the many understandings of 
the national community experienced by the people, all the corresponding ways of keeping it at a 
distance, and more particularly, of experiencing one’s individuality. The French case study shows 
empirically that the quiet, peaceful coexistence of the two models of citizenship, the two ways of 
feeling related to the national community, depends on an independent factor: a dominant 
political conception of the nation/country.  
Insert Figure 1 here 
In order to explain this, I need to introduce the four sub-models that underpin the two 
main models of citizenship developed in the analysis of the French interviews (see Figure 1). 
Actually, each of the models of citizenship has two different versions. The first model combines 
one sub model (let us call it ‘nationals’), which is an extension of the traditional Catholic concept 
of France, with another one (the ‘republicans’), which arises from the republican conception of 
the nation. In the first case, identification with France refers back to an immemorial history, 
which began centuries ago: France as it has always been, eternal France, that was once called 
Gaul, and has since managed to keep its identity unaltered. The other sub-model refers to 
another concept of France: the country of the Revolution, the nation of the little guy versus the 
big guy, who beheaded a king and declared the Rights of Man and the Citizen. Although (in the 
first sub-model) xenophobia is well represented, the people whose interviews contributed the 
most to the second sub-model expressed loudly and clearly their concern not to succumb to 
racism. The France to which they claim allegiance is a nation that was built out of struggle, a 
nation inscribed in the dynamics of history, whose project is open to all those who want to 
participate42.  
The second model has also two variants. Citizenship with reservations can be read as a 
challenge: that a human being can take a foothold in society and contribute to improving it, 
without being drowned out by it, and without blending into the masses or losing his/her 
humanity. Can one really participate and have a commitment at the collective level, political or 
otherwise, without losing one's individuality, and without at one point or another letting oneself 
be ‘distorted’? The image that often comes out in the interviews closest to this model is one of 
political activists who speak like their party leader and can only reproduce ideas developed at the 
top. The challenge of citizenship begs the question: ‘are politicians citizens?’ The negative and 
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positive responses to this question correspond to the two sub models. Those who believe that 
politicians are at least commendable for their efforts, and that it is better to take the risk of 
becoming an apparatchik than remaining a profiteer, will be referred to as ‘democrats’; those who 
do not believe that one can resist the pull of the masses and feel that the main thing is to save 
one's humanity will be called ‘world spectators’. 
It appears very clearly, that empirically the connection between the two models of 
citizenship occurs only by mixing the two sub models ‘republicans’ and ‘democrats’. The 
interviewees whose representations are very mixed between particularistic and universalistic ones 
and are able to switch from one conception to another according to the ideas and feelings 
recalled in the course of their speech, all belong to the republican or democrat sub-models. There 
is no way to bring closer together conceptions of self and society except from the two other sub 
models, ‘nationals’ and the ‘world spectators’. The few people whose interviews mixed citizenship 
by inheritance plus citizenship with reservations but in their apolitical versions, obviously feel 
uncomfortable with their representation of themselves and confront their ambivalences, which 
then appear as insuperable contradictions. The positive effect of combining cohesion and 
inclusion by mixing values and meanings belonging to opposite understandings of the national 
and civic link is obtained exclusively for people and between people whose representation of the 
nation or the country includes the idea of project or of change and, more precisely, for people 
who have a positive conception of politics43.  
If we extrapolate the findings from the sample to French civic culture, we can make the 
following hypothesis. The persistent tendency to disparage politics in France – again, not in the 
sense of the politicians’ activity, but in the anthropological sense of the legitimacy of holding 
diverging and conflictive views about the main purpose of the national community – in the last 
decades is slowly destroying the capacity of French national identity to combine two antagonistic 
understandings of the nation inherited from the past and to benefit from the advantages of both 
of them, the cohesive power of the republican and Catholic models and the inclusive potential of 
the democratic and Christian one.  
 
Conclusion: 
If the integration of migrants is a question per se in the perspective of human rights, it is 
inseparable from the problem of cohesion or involvement in the political community when 
considered in relation to democracy. Public discourses and citizenship laws are important 
indicators of the capacity of a specific country to integrate migrants. But consideration of both 
inclusion and cohesion may also require attention to the civic culture or the national identity of 
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the host country, if national identity is conceived as the whole system of meanings and values of 
the citizens in relation to the national community. This system is a very complex one, which 
includes understanding of belonging to the nation as well as feelings of distance and 
individualisation. It combines antagonistic elements, meanings and values, more or less bound up 
together. The way the system brings together cohesive values with inclusive ones is of paramount 
importance for current democratic systems.  
In the case of France, the combination of meanings inherited from competing 
understanding of citizenship, but necessary to endow the democratic process with both cohesion 
and inclusion, requires a positive evaluation of the very notion of politics. One of the many 
explanations of what happened at the 2002 presidential election is that the lack of political 
alternatives and projects in the last decade, and the growing conviction that nobody can change 
the course of events, has ruined the link between two understandings of citizenship - citizenships 
by inheritance or with reservations - and pushed back the representations that French people 
have of themselves to the exclusive and anomic versions of these representations – the nationals’ 
and world spectators’ versions. The loss of faith in the power of politics to bring about change 
has revived the dilemma of democracy between cohesion and inclusion. 
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Table 1: Summary of the Two Empirical Models of French citizenship 
 “ Citizenship by inheritance” “ Citizenship with reservations ” 
Subjects  I, we I, you 
Characteristic of the 
community  
Unity and difference Diversity and anonymity 
Identity Belonging Independence 
Loosing one’s citizenship To give up, to betray To choose, to leave 
Link between citizens Filiation, love, respect Empathy, friendship, respect 
Dynamic Memory 
To retain and pass on 
Past – present – future 
Boundaries, points of reference 
Soil, territory, borders 
Family, land 
Nature (or God) 
Concrete, real 
Creation 
To change and invent 
Transformation, break 
Restraints, obstacle 
Desert island 
Humanity 
Human being (evolution) 
Ideal, imaginary 
Morality Consciousness and goodwill Conscience and will 
 Involvement = integration Commitment = alienation 
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Figure 1: Sub-Models of French Representations of Citizenship 
 
Particularistic conception of citizenship: 
‘Citizenship by inheritance’ 
Universalistic conception of citizenship: 
‘Citizenship with reservations’  
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